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Abstract
Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and
services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown
rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as
theory have shown that they can attract skewed/unbalanced bids, i.e. bids where the
price structure is distorted to take advantage of estimation errors. This paper shows
that by either allowing for some secrecy or post tender competition, incentives in unit
price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear.
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1 Introduction
An increasing amount of organizations is using auctions to procure large amounts of goods
and services. The European Union, for instance, estimated that, within the EU, governments
and EU agencies alone procured for e1500 billion worth in goods and services, or 16% of
EU GDP in 2002 1. This is no coincidence since EU rules specify that any procurement
above certain thresholds has to be done trough some type of tender2. Although similar
developments, regulations and the problems connected to them exists in all over the world,
I will focus my analysis on the European situation with which I am most familiar.
Within the European Community all public sector tenders have to comply with either
the rules in directives 2004/17 or 2004/18 of the European Parliament and the Council. The
ultimate goal of these directives is to achieve a transparent, non-discriminatory competition
procedure, by giving all interested parties the possibility to submit an o¤er, and by judging
the o¤ers on transparent and objective criteria.
From time to time these tenders led to disputes, some of which ended in legal procedures
between the procuring government agency and one of the interested parties. The subsequent
court rulings show a legalistic view on the procurement procedures; both the legislation
covering the procedures and the requests for quotes are to be read by the letter and taken
as literally as possible to ensure equal procedures in all member states.3 This interpretation
of the rules leaves government bodies in a peculiar state; they have to adhere to strict
procedural rules and requirements, while acquiring goods and services in very diverse and
often complex settings.
1http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm
this was before the new, stronger requirements were installed. Website visited July 26 2010
2For the current thresholds see COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1177/2009, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:314:0064:0065:EN:PDF,
website visited July 29 2010,
3In one particularly sad case the government agency complained that the contract was incompletely full-
lled, since no communication devices were installed on the new sewer pumps, while the contract stipulated
that the pumps should be able to communicate. The contractor replied by claiming that the pumps were
technically capable of communication, but the contract did not stipulate that they actually communicate.
The contractor won.
1
A problem acquiring agencies encounter is that quantities are not known or can not be
specied ex ante. For instance, in a road service contract no-one can tell how many holes
will be repaired next year, so it is impossible to tell how much work will be granted. It
is therefore common practice to negotiate unit-price-contracts and calculate the nal bill
based on those prices. This way contracts can still be signed ex ante. To compare the o¤ers
made for these contracts the acquiring agency requests unit prices from possible suppliers
for all products and services that can fall under the contract. These lists of prices are then
compared by creating a score rule and selecting the o¤er with the lowest score. Returning
to the road-maintenance example, the list of prices would specify the price for anything
from moving the asphalt machine, to the price of a square meter of asphalt, to the costs of
replacing side-curbs and road markings. In these cases the score rule is usually known as
a ctional work because it simulates a large scale project, including an amount of machine
movements, top-layers to be removed and replaced etc. The total cost of this ctional work
is calculated for each bidder and the cheapest contractor for the ctional work (lowest score)
wins the auction.
At the end of the contract year the nal bill is determined by multiplying tendered unit-
prices with the work done, ignoring the ctional work used for selection. The di¤erences
between the quantities in the ctional work and the actual quantities give rise to some
unwanted e¤ects and remarkable price quotes. In a tender process that was brought to my
attention, one bidder quoted a one timee200,000 rebate on the total contract, while requiring
a mark-up of 100 times the estimated market price for one of the items in the price list.4 The
random nature of the quantities in the contract will always lead to some price uncertainty on
the nal bill, but this uncertainty is increased dramatically by such extreme per-unit prices.
This extra risk is socially undesirable, even more so for a budget driven organization. In
practice there is also the problem that contractors seem to be able to nd the misestimates
in the score rule better than the government-employees, allowing them to drive up the nal
bill. This was clearly illustrated in the tender process mentioned above. When the quantities
of the ctional work were replaced by the realized quantities from the year before, it became
clear that the winning bid would have been the most expensive contractor the year before.
4Based on price estimations made by the involved government body.
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Although this outcome might have been extreme, this type of bidding behavior is fairly
common for unit price auctions and is known as skewed or unbalanced bidding. In this
paper I add to the literature by proposing two relatively simple remedies to bid skewing
that remove the incentive to skew ex ante, an approach that has not been done before. By
either hiding the score rule or by awarding the contract to several winners and adding post-
tender competition the incentive to skew the bids is removed. For the acquiring agency this
implies that the procedure can be made to lead to the desired outcomes: fair and non-skewed
prices from a market-wide competition in a nondiscriminatory and transparent procedure.
Furthermore, I relate these adjustments to the prevailing legal environment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the problem
through the economic theory and continues by discussing some solutions found in practice or
in the literature. Section 3 goes in to detail by describing both the problem and my solutions
in terms of a model and is followed by a simplied example and some concluding remarks.
Most of the mathematical results are derived in the appendix.
2 Related literature
The theoretical discussion of unbalanced bidding can be split into two strands of literature
according to whether they study the problem from the side of the bidders or the side of the
bid-takers. The fact that prices in a unit price or scale auction could be set strategically
to increase revenue was noticed rst in the sector of operations research and construction
management. A seminal paper in this aspect is Stark (1974) In this paper Stark shows that
one can turn the process of determining the individual prices into a linear programming
problem and than solve it. In his paper he takes account of a large amount of problems and
possible objectives of the bidders, including practical issues as cashow requirements etc.
Following Stark quite some papers have been published in the operational research and
construction management literature focussing on the issue of how to place the optimal bid,
an interesting overview of this literature is given in Cattel et all. (2007).
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2.1 The theory and empirics of unbalanced bidding from the bid-
takers point of view
Fairly recently a strand of literature, including this paper, has emerged that focuses on the
e¤ects of this strategic bidding behavior for the bid-taker. From the bid-takers perspective,
the problem of unbalanced bidding can be placed in the larger problem of how to design a
multidimensional auction. In this paper, however, I do not propose an optimal mechanism
and will abstract from quality considerations. I concede that this potentially limits the scope
of application, but think that this is a necessary simplication.
Four arguments can be made to defend this abstraction. First, many governmental
organizations (which are my main focus) work with xed quality standards, such that quality
is not part of the procedure. Second, theoretical analysis in Asker & Cantillon (2008) show
that by using a e¢ cient auction fairly good results can be obtained. Thirdly, if di¤erent
qualities of a certain good/service are possible or needed, they can be added as di¤erent
goods in the contract, still allowing the bid-taker to weight in quality to some extend. Lastly
Onderstal & Van de Meerendonk (2008) report on experimental results that indicate, that
price only auctions can do fairly well as compared to beauty contest. Reassuring me that
the limitations are not too damaging. For the rest of the paper I will therefore focus on the
problem of unbalanced bidding as a pricing issue.
A seminal paper in this strand of literature is Athey & Levin (2001, further A&L). A&L
model the situation of the US Forestry Service auctioning the right to harvest all trees on
a tract of land. The Forestry Service surveys the tract to get an estimate of the amount
of trees and the relative quantities of the di¤erent species. It posts this information toward
the interested lumber companies. The lumber companies survey the area as well and create
their own estimates that generally di¤ers from the one posted by the forestry service. The
lumber companies subsequently send an o¤er to the Forestry Service specifying the price
they are willing to pay per unit of timber for each species. The Forestry Service multiplies
the per unit prices of the o¤ers with the quantities they estimated and publicized to select
the bidder from which they expect to get the biggest payment for the entire tract. A&L rst
solve for the optimal bidding strategy of the bidders, and then use this solution for structural
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analysis. They focus on the two most common types of trees. Their analysis shows that if a
bidder has a di¤erent estimation of the relative quantities of trees than the Forestry Service,
this bidder can increase his prot by increasing the price of the type the Forestry Service
relatively overestimated and decrease the price of the other type. They subsequently nd
evidence that the lumber companies use this strategy in the data. Furthermore their analysis
of the data shows that bigger misestimations of the Forestry Service make it more likely that
bidders pick up on the misestimation and skew their bid in the correct (protable) direction.
Furthermore bidders appear to use private information. The winning bidder is often the one
that skews most, although it is not signicantly di¤erent in skewness from the runner-up.
The average payment per 1000 board feet of timber falls about 3% short of the payment that
was expected from the score of the winning bid. This does not directly translate to revenue
loss however, since skewing allows bidders to bid more competitively. Although an increase
in the misestimation is correlated with an increase in the skewness of the bids, there is also
evidence that the informational rent is competed away, only a non-signicant increase in
revenue remains for the winning bidder as a result of increased misestimation on the margin.
A further theoretical contribution was by Ewerhart & Fieseler (2003, henceforth E&F).
They use a reverse auction setting in which a project has to be completed using a xed
amount of material and an amount of labor that depends on the e¢ ciency of the contractor
selected. The procurer knows the amount of material needed but only has an estimation
of the amount of labor needed. First the procurer posts a price request toward interested
contractors. The contractors bid through a unit price for labor and material. These unit
prices are then multiplied with their relative weights in the estimate of the acquirer and added
to create the nal bid. The bidder with the lowest bid is selected. E&F show that, the bid-
functions (of the nal bids) are non-monotonic in the e¢ ciency parameter. Furthermore
they show that the acquirer underestimates the payment required, i.e. the true payment is
higher than the winning aggregated bid. They go on to show that the acquirer can use the
score-rule to intensify competition in such a way that it more than compensates for possible
e¢ ciency losses or information rents, which will be discussed in more detail in the solutions
subsection below.
A critical empirical analyses was provided by Bajari, Houghton, & Tadelis(2006). They
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use panel data collected from the California Department of Transportation to estimate the
e¤ects of adaptation cost, private information and local market power on the nal bill, while
also taking incentives to skew into account. Their data analyses suggests that adaptation
cost are the most important cost determining factor in the procedures they studied, but they
still nd a modest but signicant mark-up due to skewed bidding, even in the presence of
large adaptation costs.
Finally Agarwal, Athey & Yang (2009) found that the problems in the Pay Per Action
auction Google introduced for its ad-words in 2007(the biggest real-time auction in the world)
are also quite easily classied as skewed bidding. In this auction the di¤erence between the
estimates of Google and the bidders were not only caused by di¤erences in information, but
also because the bidders could actively increase or decrease the prevalence of certain actions.
A bidder could, for instance, set a high fee for every time a certain link is clicked and then
hide or remove the link so that link is always overweighed by Google. By alternating links to
be overweighted and underweighted, the system was quite easily played. These issues caused
Google to return to the Pay Per Click auction they used before.
2.2 solutions in theory and practice
Both in the literature and in practice attempts have been made to solve the problem of
skewed bidding, but most of these are based on dealing with the skewed bid ex post, instead of
stopping them ex ante. One could argue that the multi-round or hybrid (optimal) mechanism
prescribed for the multi-attribute procurement in papers like Che (1993) could be adapted,
but this fundamentally changes the mechanism. In this paper I like to add to the literature
by suggesting ways to make skewing unprotable ex ante, without changing the fundamental
mechanism of the unit price auction.
The problem of bid skewing has evidently been recognized in both the US and Europe,
since the rules governing public procurement allow government agencies to reject "materially
unbalanced" (US) or "abnormally low" (EU) bids 5. Although this regulation might allow
5US: art. 14.404-2 jo. 15.404-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations.
EU: art 57 DIRECTIVE 2004/17/EC or art 55 DIRECTIVE 2004/18/EC
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agencies to reject unbalanced bids, it is does not stop unbalancing. It is only possible to
reject an o¤er once it has been made, implying that these rules are not meant to end skewing,
just to deal with it ex post. Furthermore, the rationale for picking the lowest price is to
minimize cost, so rejecting the winning bid is, on the face of it, counterproductive. There
might be some positive incentive working through these rules, however, since bidding just
to get rejected can not be an equilibrium strategy. Unfortunately, for the EU at least this
incentive is severely limited through the legal di¢ culties of dening abnormally low bid.
Bajari, Houghton & Tadelis (2006) do report some anecdotal evidence that this possibility
has decreased unbalanced bidding. Skewed bidding is arguably one of the most important
reasons to reject bids, which they report happens with 4% of the bids in the US. This risk
of rejection is mentioned within the construction management literature as well, see for
instance Cattell et all (2007), so the rules probably have e¤ect. It is important, however, to
distinguish between the EU and the US. The US has quite extensive rules on how to deal
with irregular bids in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the EU does not. There have been
cases within the EU involving a government agency that rejects an abnormally low o¤er, but
if brought before a court these have granted injunctions quite easily, making it economically
less appealing to do so.6
Another solution used by many government agencies is to include in their standard terms
a clause about severe misestimations. If an estimated quantity is overrun by a certain
percentage (usually ranging between 10 and 25%) the unit price is renegotiated. This has
the potential to limit the prots of skewing, although the other party is always at the
negotiation table with them.
Many government agencies have tried to reduce the problems by bringing more expertise
into the acquiring agency and reducing the gap between the score rule and the expected
quantities. This does seem to alleviate the problem, but does not necessarily solve the
problem, since estimation always has some error.7
6see for instance: Rb. Arnhem 15 Februari 2010, LJN: BL5214, case number 194578.
A unit price of 0.01 euros for service on di¤erent locations was not enough to conclude that the tender
was abnormally low.
7I talked to the people in charge of these procedures in the city of Rotterdam about bid-skewing and
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Returning to the papers mentioned before, A&L note that the Forestry Service can set
reserve prices, requiring bidders to bid at least some minimum price for the major species.
This e¤ectively limits the room bidders have to skew. Unfortunately, this only works if
the bid-taker has enough information on the market prices, because setting these limits too
stringently they could scare away bidders, hindering competition. Minimum prices do not
however decrease the incentive to skew. In fact it creates a situations in which types are not
revealed in the bids since pooling on the reserve prices can and does occur both in theoretical
equilibrium and in real outcomes.
Using a mechanism design approach E&F create an optimal score rule, which can also
be seen as a solution. In short, the score rule is used to subsidize ine¢ cient producers,
which leads to more competitive pressure on the e¢ cient bidders, and thus lower prices.
There are several objections to this solution. First, it requires the acquiring agency to have
enough knowledge about the cost structure in the market, which it might not have. In E&F
information is single dimensional, while it is very much multidimensional in real life. When
an agency needs more than 500 unit-prices, nding the right score rule for the job maybe
very hard or impossible, even if the distribution of cost-types is known. Second, the authors
already note that this procedure does not guarantee allocative e¢ ciency. In his e¤orts to
increase competition the acquiring agency creates a positive probability that an ine¢ cient
contractor wins. The size of this problem in a one shot game is debatable. In terms of ex
ante expected cost, the increased competition more than compensates for the increased cost
in case an ine¢ cient contractor wins. The third objection seems most severe, even if we
disregard allocative e¢ ciency and assume that the government can determine the optimal
score rule, how will the contractors respond in the medium to long run? The optimization in
E&F is static, while many real life procurement situations are repeated over and over again,
and thus require a dynamic approach. In the road maintenance example the argument
can be made more concrete. Given that contractors are willing to skew to the extent they
have shown in the past, what is stopping them from faking ine¢ ciency to prot from this
subsidization of ine¢ ciency? In fact, if ine¢ ciency is indirectly rewarded by a chance to win,
their reaction was illustrative. They had noticed that basing the score rule on past quantities decreased the
amount of skewing, but did not make it disappear.
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why not specialize, or invest in ine¢ cient production technology to optimally exploit this
subsidy?
3 The model
3.1 current process, or the rules of the game
Assume there is one acquiring agency that holds a procurement auction for a contract and
there are N  2 interested parties, or bidders. At the moment the auction is held the
M quantities required to service the contract, summarized in vector q(vectors are in bold-
face), are uncertain. Both the agency and all bidders receive a private signal about the
quantities, si;(through out the paper subscripts denote players and superscripts units or
bundles of units, the subscript 0 will be used to denote the agency) that they use to determine
their expectations. Furthermore, before bidders submit their bid the agency announces a
score function used to rate the bids. This score function is fully described by the vector 
containing the weights attached to each of the M products needed in the contract. This
score function can be based upon the private information of the agency about the quantities.
Subsequently all bidders submit a bid consisting of a vector pi containingM per-unit prices.
The agency then selects the winner by picking the lowest of the scores Bi = pTi ; the winning
rm serves the contract, while the loosing rms earn a reservation prot normalized to zero.
Since the winning bidder will serve the contract, and has no inuence on q, prot maxi-
mization is equivalent to revenue maximization and bidders will be treated as revenue max-
imizers.
E&F and A&L show that, in respectively the Symmetric Independent Private Value and
the Common Value setting, from the point of view of each bidder the bid can be split in
to two relevant parts: his score Bi that determines the chance he wins, and the vector pi
that determines the per-unit prices if he wins. This implies that the optimal bid can be
determined in two steps, rst determine the optimal skew, that is the optimal structure of
pi (given the signals and nal bid), and then calculate the optimal score given this skew
(and the signal). This is also the strategy that is prescribed by many of the authors in the
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operational research, see Cattel et all. (2007) for examples.
The same process is at work both in the normal unit price auction and in the reverse
auction of the unit price procurement procedure. For my purposes the relatively easy to tract
SIPV auction therefore su¢ ces and I will treat both parts of the bidding process separately.
Given the bids, the nal payments will depend on the realized quantities q. Since these
quantities are not known ex ante, the bidders use their private signal bsi = E(qjsi;) to
determine their bids.
3.2 Problem analysis
The expected revenue of the winner is pTi bsi while the score is Bi = pTi , so there is a
discrepancy when bsi 6= . As is shown in the literature, bidders should overprice any unit
that is relatively underweighted in the score function (relative to their expectations), and
subsequently underprice any unit that is overweighted, to keep Bi on the desired level, while
increasing their expected prot.
To illustrate this, take two units for which m = n, but bsmi > bsni , then Bi does not
increase if pmi is increased by " > 0 while p
n
i is decreased by ", is expected turn-over however
increases by (bsmi   bsni )" > 0, without changing the cost of the work or a¤ecting the chance
of winning.
A&L show that, if one assumes risk aversion of the bidders, the problem can be stated in
the following way. Let zi be the vector of prices that yields the bidders the same (normal)
prot-margin on all units. Then dene pi = pi zi as the o¤set from this normal vector.
kpik Is then a measure of the skewness of the bid. While the extra price variance due
to skewing becomes var(pTi q) = p
T
i
Pqpi, with Pqthe covariance matrix of q. This
implies that the variance of skewing prots increases quadratically in the skew, while the
skewing prot itself only increases linearly. Therefore the possibility frontier linking skewing
variance and skewing prots is concave and under risk aversion this problem has a unique
solution as in standard portfolio theory.
In the end, for the agency conducting the unit price auction, skewing has the possibility
to lead to a higher nal bill (due to an information rent) and always leads to larger ex ante
price uncertainty, since the variance of the nal bill increases quadratically in the amount of
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skewing. For the bidders the procedure has some informational rents, but they come at the
cost of unproductive extra risk, which could be hard to bear for the smaller participants in
the market.
Both the possible higher nal bill and the uncertainty over the nal bill are caused by the
skewness of the bids. Bidders skew their bids for two reasons. First, it gives them a higher
expected prot if they win. Second, it allows them to bid more aggressively and thus increases
their chance of winning, which in theory means the winner always skews his bid (A&L). The
protability of skewing is caused by di¤erences between the relative quantities in the score
rule , and the expected quantities bsi. The obvious solution to this problem is decreasing
these di¤erences. To achieve this bidders should not posses any information advantage over
the acquirer, while in the standard procedure the acquiring agency announces his score rule.
By using a score rule equal to or based on his estimate of the real quantities, the agency
reveals his estimate. Which means bidders always have at least as much information as
the acquirer to base their estimate on. So, although well estimated score rules may reduce
the problem, to overcome the problem altogether a di¤erent solution should be sought.
Franchising the contract can be done, it however changes the nature of the contract quite
considerably so falls outside of the scope of this paper.
3.3 secret score rule
Keeping the score rule secret can end skewing. Since bidders do not know how the skewness
of their bids will a¤ect their chance of winning, they would have to guess at both the agencys
estimate and the true state to determine their bid, which makes skewing extremely risky.
This possibility will even disappear if the acquiring agency bases the score rule on an unbiased
signal of q, so  is an unbiased estimator of q such as s0. In that case E() = E(q) and no
expected overweighting exists.
Unfortunately, at least within the EU, a secret score rule is legally di¢ cult. Art. 55(2)
of Directive 2004/17/EC and art. 53(2) of Directive 2004/18/EC read, the contracting
authority shall specify,. . . , the relative weighting which it gives to each of the criteria chosen
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to determine the most economically advantageous tender8. This does not seem to leave
much room for secrecy, but the second paragraph of these articles might provide a loophole.
"Those weightings can be expressed by providing for a range with an appropriate maximum
spread."
If the spread of this range is big enough to hide , the bidders will still have to guess at the
way skewing their bid inuences their chance of winning. By using a big enough spread, such
that smi 2 [m   "m; m + "m] and using a mixed strategy in determining the ranges around
di¤erent weights (i.e. "m 6= "m and both are random) the agency can obscure his estimate to
the point that E() = E(q). The mixed strategy also ensures that bidders cannot backwards
engineer the agencies estimates from the score rule. I have found no instances in practice
where the weights are presented in a spread, and case-law on the subject of transparency
does not seem to provide much room. So it seems like a di¢ cult strategy to follow.
3.4 split award auction
Instead of o¤ering the entire contract to one winner, it is possible to simultaneously grant
parts of the contract to two or more winners. In the EU this can be done trough a framework
contract, which can be used to selected 3 or more suppliers simultaneously. This makes this
procedure easy to implement, since it is essentially a version of an existing procedure.
Selecting several winners reduces the tender procedure to a pre-selection tool. The auction
selects preferred suppliersand when a job occurs (a road deteriorates to the point that
replacement is needed) the most economically advantageous of the preferred suppliers gets
the job. Jobs are described by a vector ql specifying the quantities required for this sub-part
of the larger contract, such that q =
PL
l=1 q
l:
Splitting the contract leads to a kind of post-auction competition, which the bidders will
have to take into account when preparing their o¤ers. The possibility of the bid-taker to
single-sidedly allocate jobs allows him to punish bidders by assigning them the jobs that are
8Directive 2004/17/EC: water, energy, transport and postal services sectors
And
Directive 2004/18/EC: public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts
Are the main directives in public procurement in the EU
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intensive in the units they underpriced.
I claim that this procedure solves the bid skewing problem in the sense that it can assign
the contract to the most e¢ cient parties and bid skewing is eliminated, while retaining or
reattaining the desired non-discriminant, transparent and open procedure that treats all
party equally. I will start by showing the e¢ ciency result and then show that an equilibrium
exists in which bidders do not skew. Then a simplied example is given where uniqueness
of equilibrium can easily be shown.
3.4.1 e¢ ciency of the procedure
Suppose the contract is split up in P parts, so there are P objects for sale and N > P > 1
bidders. Bidders are allowed to win at most one object. Valuations vi are independently and
identically distributed over some interval and admit cumulative distribution function F ().
Bidder i assigns a value 1vi to object 1 and 2vi to object 2. All vi are private information,
N; ap; 8p 2 [1; 2; ::; P ] and F () are common knowledge and identical across bidders, with
P+1 = 0. Without loss of generality I assume p > p+1 , which means contract parts are
ordered in size. The scaling through p implies that each bidder prefers the rst object over
the second. The simplest interpretation is to assume bidders prefer a bigger part to a smaller
part, which is a natural conclusion if no skewing exists.
All bidders simultaneously submit a private bid bi. The acquiring agency ranks the bids
in size and the bidder with the highest bid receives object 1 and pays 1bi, the runner up
gets object 2 and pays 2bi etc. Note that payment also varies with the contract size, i.e.
the payment is also scaled trough the series .
Proposition 1 In a procedure with several winners an equilibrium with an e¢ cient alloca-
tion still exists.
Allocative e¢ ciency requires the P objects to go to the P bidders with the highest
valuations in order of their valuation. This requires bidders to follow a bidding strategy that
is symmetric and monotonically increasing in vi so I will focus on those strategies (vi) that
posses these qualities and have an inverse function  1(b) = (b) = v.
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Denoting with u[] a concave utility function that is the same for all bidders, and dening:
(x) = Cp 1n 1

(1  F (x)))p 1(F (x)))n p
the game has an equilibrium in bidfunctions where all bidders use the following bid-
function (derivation in appendix)
(vi) =
Z vi
0
 PP
p=1 pu [(x  b)p] 0((b))PP
p=1 
2
pu
0 [(x  b)p] ((b))
!
dx
Which is monotonically increasing in vi if pu0 [(vi   b)p] > p+1u0 [(vi   b)p+1]. This
condition holds trivially if 1 = 1 and if p = p+1, so the constraint is not very restrictive.
As long as the contract sizes are chosen reasonably and ordered in size as assumed the bid
functions are increasing.
For risk neutral bidders the bid function can be determined exactly:
(vi) = vi  
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dxPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
(1)
Which is monotonically increasing in v if p > p+1 (see appendix) which holds trivially
if the contracts are ordered in size and is the same condition as before since under risk
neutrality the rst derivative to u is constant. This bid function strongly resembles the
bidfunctions in the single object rst price sealed bid auction, in fact using P = 1 and
1 = 1 yields the standard bid-function.
3.4.2 Balancing the bids
To see that skewing is unprotable in this situation let the contract be split up into two
parts, P = 2, such that every time a job occurs, the acquiring agency can select one of the
two preferred suppliers, i and j. Each job can be described with a vector, ql, containing all
quantities needed to complete the job. The price for each job is P li = p
T
i q
l:
Proposition 2 Conditional on the procedure being allocatively e¢ cient, the post-tender
competition will make skewing unprotable and thus end bid skewing.
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After the preferred suppliers are selected, the agency assigns each job using a "mini-
tender", he calculates P li and P
l
j and selects the lowest one, given the prices o¤ered in the
original tender. The expected skewing prot of a job to the bidder that gets this job is:
E(pTi q
ljP li < P lj), which can be both positive and negative, depending on the skew of his
fellow preferred supplier.
There are four possibilities after the auction for which interim expected skewing-prots
can be determined:
1. the preferred suppliers have both not skewed;
2. only one of them skewed, the other did not skew;
3. they have skewed in di¤erent directions;
4. they have skewed in the same directions.
Since there is no problem in case 1, I will not treat it in debt.
Proposition 1 establishes allocative e¢ ciency of the procedure, so I will assume that the
two preferred supplier, i and j, are the most e¢ cient parties, and thus zi t zj:
ad 2. If only i skewed, and j bids zj it is quite easy to see that
P li < P
l
j ! (pi   zi)Tql . (pj   zj)Tq ! pTi ql . 0ql such that E(
PL
1 p
T
i q
ljP li <
P lj) < 0 as long as zi t zj. This is intuitive since prices for this job are on average below
the zero skewing-prot prices of the next competitor.
ad 3 If they skewed on di¤erent units altogether, they both get all the jobs they under-
priced and thus have a negative skewing prot. To see this, realize that to keep their score
Bi = p
T
i  at a winning level they have to skew as much downward as upward (weighted
through the score rule). Since they skewed in di¤erent directions, the acquiring agency can
assign them all jobs they underpriced. The jobs they overpriced go to the other player (who
might have underpriced those) at least partially. This means skewing decreases prot as
long as those overpriced units they incidentally get, do not compensate for taking the full
loss over the underpriced units. Therefore the expected value is negative as long as the score
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rule is close enough to the expected quantities and I will assume E(pTi q
ljP li < P lj) < 0 as
well.
ad 4 If both skewed on the same units and in the same way two situations are possible:
IfpTi q
l;pTj q
l < 0, the skewing-prot is negative and decreases linearly in the amount
of skewing, so the one that skews most would have most losses. However given
zi t zj; jjpijj > jjpjjj ! (pi+zi)Tql . (pj+zj)Tql ! P li . P lj , so that the
one that skews most is most likely to get the jobs intensive in the products he underpriced,
therefore E(pTi q
ljP li < P lj ;pTi ql;pTj ql < 0) < 0.
If pTi q
l;pTj q
l > 0 the reverse holds. The skewing-prot increases linearly in the
amount of skewing, but
zi t zj; jjpijj < jjpjjj (pi+zi)Tql . (pj+zj)Tql ! P li . P lj . So the one with
the smallest skew is most likely to get the job. In this case skewing-prots can be positive
but only for the one with the smallest skew.
By combining the last two situations one can conclude the expected skewing-prot is
negative in situation 4 as well. To keep their score on a winning level, the (score rule
weighted) average positive skew should be of similar size to the average downward skew
within each bid. Then, as long as the score rule is close enough to the real outcomes, bidders
either get a relatively big loss or a relatively small prot of skewing. So as long as the
score rule is close enough to the expected quantities, the interim expected value of a skew is
negative.
The ex ante expected skewing-prot, E(pTi q
ljP li < P lj) is a convex combination of the
expected prot in the four possible situations. If a score rule is chosen that is close to the
actual quantities, the interim expected skewing-prot is non positive in all situations and
strictly negative in at least one, making skewing unprotable in expected terms. Therefore,
skewing should disappear if a score rule is used that is close enough to the real quantities.
Using a score rule that is equal to the expected values thus has a double purpose, it selects
the sellers that are most e¢ cient and helps prevent skewing.
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3.4.3 conclusion
Proposition 1 shows that in equilibrium the procedure is e¢ cient if the valuations are sym-
metric, private and independently distributed. Proposition 2 shows that in equilibrium the
bidders will not want to skew given that the procedure is e¢ cient and the others bidders
dont skew. If bidders dont skew, their valuation of the contract only depends on their
type zi, which is private and can be assumed to be independent. So this procedure has an
equilibrium in which bidders do not skew their bids and the allocation is e¢ cient.
4 Illustration of the split-award auction
4.1 balancing the bid, binomial case
To make the statements in the last section more tangible some simplications are in order.
Assume again that a reverse auction has been used to select two preferred suppliers, P = 2,
but focus for now on only 2 elements of the vector q; product a and product b with a =
b = . Whether or not a unit of these products is required in each job is independently
and binomially distributed (either 1 or 0 units are needed). The chance a unit of a (b) is
needed is a (b). The bidders quantity estimation then becomes their estimation of this
probability and satises fsai , sbig = fsaj , sbjg = fsa, sbg, furthermore both elements cost c to
produce. The expected prot for a bidder getting the entire contract then becomes:
full = s
a(1  sb)(pai   c) + sb(1  sa)(pbi   c) + sbsa(pbi   c+ pai   c)
Then increasing the price of a with p while decreasing the price of b with the same
amount creates expected skewing prot per job:
skew = p[sa(1  sb)  sb(1  sa)]
While their score is
Bi = (p
a
i + p
b
i)
So, if the contract is awarded in one piece, it is protable to skew if fsai ; sbig 6= fa; bg
and bidders set p positive (negative) if sa > sb (sa < sb), i.e. if a is underweighted the
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price of a is increased. Note that the price of b is decreased to maintain the level of the nal
bid Bi, just like before.
The split-award procedure is as before, the agency assigns the jobs to the preferred
suppliers based on their price for that individual job.
Proposition 3 In the binomial case the unique equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium
where no player skews
After winners are selected, nature can draw 4 types of jobs: jobs that only require a; jobs
that only require b; jobs that require both a and b; and jobs that require no units of a or b.
In the last two cases the skew on units a and b has no inuence on the price of the job and
the skewing prot is 0 per denition, so these can be ignored.
Focussing on the rst two situations it is clear that positively skewing in a, will lead to
a problem if b is required and vice versa. The pure strategy equilibrium is therefore quite
easily constructed, if bidder i does not skew, the best response of bidder j is not to skew as
well. Without skewing the situation is essentially Bertrand competition, so the only thing
one has to realize is that by increasing the price of a bidder j ensures he is more expensive
in a and therefore never gets any of the protable jobs. However, if a job comes up requiring
b he has the lowest price, gets the job and takes the loss, making skewing unprotable.
No equilibrium in mixed strategies exists. A mixed equilibrium where player i skews
a xed and known amount with some probability does not exist. The best response of
player j to such a strategy of i is to skew slightly less and get only the protable jobs, is
best response is then to undercut js best response etc. Since there is no restriction on the
biddingspace this logic also excludes strategies over a noncontinuous interval, which is like
Bertrand competition in skewness instead of in prices.
As in Bertrand competition it is theoretically possible to have a mixed strategy equi-
librium where bidders skew with some distribution over some interval. To show that these
strategies can not be equilibrium either, assume rst that an equilibrium exists where both i
and j skew over some appropriate interval [c; d]. Assume sa > sb so p  0 and dene F ()
as the Cumulative Distribution Function of p. In that case we know that the expected
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prot of skewing for each single job of a winning bidder is the same on the entire interval:
skew = sa(1  F (p))p  sbF (p)p = e
rewriting, taking into account that e must be xed in equilibrium, this leads to:
F (p) =
sa   e=p
sa + sb
Since F () is a CDF it should be weakly increasing over some interval until it reaches 1. F ()
can only ever be 1 if e=p =  sb, while to derive this function we assumed p  0 such that
e=p =  sb implies e < 0. Since any player can simply guarantee himself a zero skewing
prot by not skewing, playing a strategy with negative expected value is strictly dominated
by not skewing.
The same reasoning used to exclude mixed equilibria with xed and known amounts of
skewness can be used to exclude mass-points in the distribution everywhere except on the
lower bound. However, if a distribution has a mass-point only on the lower bound it is still
continuous and weakly increasing over the interval. Under the assumption e > 0 and p > 0
the rst derivative of the CDF is negative, which is also not possible, so we can exclude these
equilibria as well.
Since this is all known ex-ante, so long as sb; sa 6= 0 the unique equilibrium of this game
is one where no player skews.
5 Conclusions and concluding remarks
Although bid skewing is a common problem in unit price auctions, solutions do exist. In
this paper I showed two relatively easy adjustments to the unit price auction that could
decrease if not eliminate bid skewing altogether. Even though the rst solution, obscuring
the score rule, might not be legally allowed for governmental agencies (within the EU at
least), they to have a readily available solution in the split award procedure in a framework
contract. The non-governmental parties using a reverse auction are o¤ course not bound by
the transparency requirements.
If the split award procedure is chosen, the way the contract is split has profound inuence
on the way bidders should behave. The exact e¤ects are not analyzed in this paper, but a
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related subject is already analyzed in Alcalde & Dahm (2009). They show that strategically
choosing the contracts sizes might be used to mitigate the loss in e¢ ciency caused by selecting
more than only the most e¢ cient bidder.
A problem I have ignored in this paper sofar is collusion. In splitting the contract, the
procedure can become very sensitive to collusion, see for instance Anton & Yao (1989). The
procedure I propose is more robust then the one described there, because the decision to split
is taken exogenously. This makes it impossible for bidders to select price-quantity combina-
tions. In Anton & Yao (1989) it is this ability, just as in second degree price discrimination,
that helps bidders coordinate. Having said that, the possibilities of a bid ring to dissipate
prots increases if more winners are selected, making bidding rings easier to set up. On the
other hand, if the ring skews, this makes it protable for any bidder to break the ring by
skewing slightly less, which automatically gives the tenderer the possibility to punish the
skewing preferred supplier. How this plays out in theory or in practice remains for further
research.
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7 appendix
7.1 Derivation of bid-functions
Denoting by Y() the order statistics, such that maxfb1;:::; bng = Y(n), and having () =  1;
such that (b) = v, the expected prot of an o¤er bi is :
i(b) = Pr(bi = Y(n))  1(vi   b) + Pr(bi = Y(n 1)) 2(vi   b):::
given symmetry of bidders and strategies: bi = (vi), so (b) = v and recalling that F ()
is the CDF of v:
i(b; vi) = a1(vi   b)C0n 1(1  F ((b)))0(F ((b)))n 1 + a2(vi   b)C0n 1(1  F ((b)))1(F ((b)))n 2::
i(b; vi) =
PX
p=1
(vi   b)pCp 1n 1(1  F ((b)))p 1(F ((b)))n p (2)
where C is the binomial coe¢ cient.
Then, adapted from Menezes & Monteiro (1998), dene:
	(x) =
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x)))p 1(F (x)))n p]
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Lemma 1 for any integer P; 1  P < N; and  2 Rp+1; ap+1 = 09
@
@x
	(x) = f(x)
lX
p=1
(ap   ap+1) (n  p)Cp 1n 1
 
(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p 1 = 	0(x) (3)
proof see below. Then the prot function can be written as:
i(b) = (vi   b)	((b)) (4)
The FOC becomes:
@i(b; vi)
@b
= (vi   b)0(b)	0((b)) 	((b)) = 0 (5)
Since I assume the bidding-function to be twice di¤erentiable and symmetric across bid-
ders, I can replace 0(v) by 1
0(v) ; b by (vi) and (b) by vi, then rewriting yields:
vi	
0(vi) = 
0(vi)	(vi) + (vi)	0(vi)
Note that 0(v)	(v)+(v)	0(v) = [(v)	(v)]0,integrating both sides and setting (0) = 0
yields:
(vi) =
R vi
0
x	0(x)dx
	(vi)
=
R vi
0
xf(x)
PP
p=1 (ap   ap+1) (n  p)Cp 1n 1 ((1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p 1) dxPP
p=1 tC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
(6)
or alternatively, trough integration by parts:
(vi) = vi  
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dxPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
(7)
Which is monotonically increasing in v if p p+1  0 (see below) which holds trivially
if the contracts are ordered in size.
Allowing for risk aversion the problem has to be slightly restated. Given symmetry
amongst bidders, (v) = b, and (b) = v being used by other players as well so
Assume all bidders have the same utility function u [], their problem becomes:
max
b
U(i(b; vi)) :
PX
p=1
u [(vi   b)p]Cp 1n 1(1  F ((b)))p 1(F ((b)))n p
9addapted from Menezes & Monteiro(1998)
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Then dene:
(x) = pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x)))p 1(F (x)))n p]
such that:
U(i(b; vi)) =
PP
p=1 u [(vi   b)p] ((b))
Then the FOC becomes:
U(i(b;vi))
b
=
PP
p=1 u [(vi   b)p] 0((b))0(b)  pu0 [(vi   b)p] ((b)) = 0PP
p=1 u [(vi   b)p] 0((b))0(b) =
PP
p=1 pu
0 [(vi   b)p] ((b))
Since I assume the bidding-function to be twice di¤erentiable, I can replace 0(vi) by
1
0(vi)
,PP
p=1 u [(vi   b)p] 0((b)) = 0(vi)
PP
p=1 pu
0 [(vi   b)p] ((b))
Then rewriting and integrating, while setting (0) = 0 yields
(vi) =
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pu[(x b)p]0((b))PP
p=1 
2
pu
0[(x b)p]((b))

dx
7.2 proof of Lemma 3
Take N=5 and P=4
 = a1C
0
4(1  F (x))0(F (x))4 + a2C14(1  F (x))1(F (x))3 + a3C24(1  F (x))2(F (x))2
+a4C
3
4(1  F (x))3(F (x))1
@
@x
= a14C
0
4(F (x))
3f(x)  a2C14(F (x))3f(x) + a23C14(1  F (x))1(F (x))2f(x)
 a32C24(1  F (x))1(F (x))2f(x) + a32C24(1  F (x))2(F (x))1f(x)
 a43C34(1  F (x))2(F (x))1f(x) + a4C34(1  F (x))3f(x)
simplifying and generalizing:
0(x) = f(x)
0@ (a1   a2)4C04(F (x))3 + (a2   a3)3C14(1  F (x))1(F (x))2
+(a3   a4)2C24(1  F (x))2(F (x)) + a44C34(1  F (x))3
1A
0(x) = f(x)
PP
p=1 (ap   ap+1) (n  p)Cp 1n 1 ((1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p 1)
7.3 Proof of monotonicity of bid functions under risk neutrality
(vi) = vi  
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dxPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (v))p 1(F (v))n p]
di¤erentiating according to the rules for fractions and simplifying:
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0(vi) = 1 
hPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i

hPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i
hPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i2
  R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dx 
hPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i0
hPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i2 (8)
0(vi) = 1  (1 
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dxhPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i2 (9)

"
PX
p=1
pC
p 1
n 1

(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p
#0
)
0(vi) =
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dxhPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i2 (10)

"
PX
p=1
pC
p 1
n 1

(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p
#0
(11)
0(vi) =
R vi
0
PP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p] dxhPP
p=1 pC
p 1
n 1 [(1  F (vi))p 1(F (vi))n p]
i2 (12)

"
f(x)
PX
p=1
(ap   ap+1) (n  p)Cp 1n 1
 
(1  F (x))p 1(F (x))n p 1# > 0 (13)
Where the last inequality holds, because it is the integral of a strictly positive function
times a sum of positive terms as long as ap ap+1  0; divided by a square. So for any series
 for which ap   ap+1  0 holds the function is increasing in v or in terms of the contracts,
the contracts are ordered in terms of size, which can be assumed without loss of generality.
7.4 monotonicity of the bid functions under risk aversion
Recall that the bidfunction can be expressed as:
(vi) =
R vi
0
 PP
p=1 u[(x b)p]0((b))PP
p=1 pu
0[(x b)p]((b))

dx
To check that this is indeed an increasing function of vi, as assumed, I follow the Monotone
Comparative Statics approach from Milgrom & Shannon (1994) and Milgrom & Roberts,
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(1994). Returning to the goal function to check for the required single crossing property, we
see that in optimum:
@U(i(b;vi))
@vi
=
PP
p=1 pu
0 [(vi   b)p] ((b)) = 0
@2U(i(b;v))
@bv
=
PP
p=1 2pu00 [(vi   b)p] ((b)) +
PP
p=1 pu
0 [(vi   b)p] 0((b))0(b)
Since the second derivative of the utility function is negative, the rst summation is
positive as long as the bid function is increasing (as assumed). As in lemma 3 we know
that
PP
p=1 pu
0 [(vi   b)p] 0((b)) consists of all positive parts as long as pu0 [(vi   b)p] >
p+1u
0 [(vi   b)p+1], which is the same condition as under risk neutrality, since there u0() =
1, and puts a restriction on the size of the contract parts. Note, however, that this condition
holds trivially if 1 = 1 and if p = p+1, so the constraint is not very restrictive. Provided
the size of the contracts are chosen reasonably and contracts are ordered in size, we can
assume the second summation is positive as well.
So we can conclude that @U
@vi
satises the required single crossing property, since its partial
cross-derivative is positive, then the monotone comparative statics result (theorem 1)from
Milgrom & Roberts, (1994) ascertains that the bid function is increasing in vi. There exists
a symmetric equilibrium with a monotonically increasing bid function.
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